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Real-time estimates of the potential output are essential in the EU fiscal surveillance framework. They 
are used for the calculation of the cyclically-adjusted budget balance, one of the main indicators in the 
assessment of the fiscal performance of EU Member States.  
The estimation of potential output involves a decomposition of actual output into a cyclical and a 
potential component based on to some extent arbitrary assumptions about the statistical properties of 
the two unobserved components. Depending on those assumptions, the potential output estimate may 
exhibit a higher or lower degree of smoothness which in turn affects the assessment of the underlying 
budgetary position. With a very high degree of smoothing, variations in GDP are mostly taken to be 
temporary as are the ensuing changes in the headline deficit. Conversely, with a low degree of 
smoothing, variations in GDP are mostly taken to be permanent. In this case, deteriorations of the 
headline deficit will be interpreted differently and lead to different policy conclusions. 
Our paper examines whether and how different degrees of smoothness of potential output would have 
supported different decisions in the EU budgetary surveillance in terms of both timing and substance. 
The results of our simulations show that, the accuracy of the diagnostic instruments especially those 
that measure the risk of breaching the 3% of GDP reference value of the Treaty is surprisingly robust. 
Only a very high and excessive degree of smoothing of potential output would significantly reduce the 
reliability of the surveillance indicators.  
In the light of our results, a somewhat higher degree of smoothing compared with the current practice 
would not seem to be harmful for EU fiscal surveillance. During economic upturns it would guaranty a 
higher degree of caution by signalling larger and possibly longer periods of economic 'good times' 
which would in turn warrant more fiscal consolidation.  
 
 
                                                 
1 We thank the participants of the ECB Public Finance Workshop held in Frankfurt on 12 December 2006 for 
helpful comments. We are particularly grateful to Matthias Mohr and Mikko Spolander and for insightful 
suggestions. Comments by Marco Buti were equally useful.   2
1. Introduction and motivation 
The cyclically-adjusted budget balance (CAB), i.e. the budget balance net of cyclical factors, 
plays an important role in the EU fiscal surveillance framework, the Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP). It is a key diagnostic instrument in both the preventive and corrective arm of the Pact. 
In the preventive arm it is used to guide and assess budgetary developments in the Member 
States through the economic cycle towards a medium-term budgetary objective that ensures 
sustainability in the long term. The main idea is to track the underlying as opposed to the 
nominal budgetary position so as to let automatic stabilisers smooth the fluctuations of 
economic activity without breaching the 3% of GDP threshold of the Treaty for the nominal 
deficit. In the corrective arm of the Pact the change of the CAB is used as a measure of the 
fiscal effort taken by Member States with a view to correcting an excessive deficit. 
One of the major uncertainties surrounding the calculation of the CAB is the estimation of the 
potential output and the output gap, unobserved measures for respectively the permanent and 
transitory component of GDP. The uncertainty inter alia mirrors the ambiguous nature of 
economic fluctuations. As highlighted by Orphanides and Van Norden (2002) potential output 
and output gap estimates will typically depend on the professed model of the economy i.e. 
whether economic activity is thought to evolve around a stable trend or whether GDP is taken 
to be largely driven by a sequence of permanent shocks. Depending on whether fluctuations in 
economic activity are thought to be more or less cyclical in nature, one and the same change 
in the headline budget balance will give rise to completely different interpretations and 
potentially to different policy conclusions. In case potential output was thought to be very 
smooth, improvements or deteriorations in a given headline deficit would have a minor 
impact on the assessment of the underlying budget position. In particular, as long the deficit 
remained below the 3% of GDP reference value of the Treaty a deterioration would not give 
rise to concerns in terms of the medium-term orientation of fiscal policy. By way of contrast, 
if potential output was thought to be subject to frequent permanent shocks, a deterioration of 
the headline deficit would also affect the assessment of the underlying budgetary position and 
hence warrant corrective measures. 
This paper investigates how different measurements of potential output would have affected 
the diagnostic accuracy of the CAB in the framework of the EU budgetary surveillance. Using 
the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter - the most popular estimation method for potential output and 
the output gap in practice - we analyse whether and to what extent different values for the 
smoothing parameter λ would have supported different assessments of fiscal policy in the euro 
area Member States. The smoothing parameter λ can be taken to reflect different views about 
the underlying economic model, where a higher (lower) value would be consistent with the 
idea of a smoother (less smooth) potential output estimate.  
Our main interest lies in the typical assessment cycle of the EU fiscal surveillance framework. 
Twice a year, in spring and autumn, the Commission services publish fully-fledged 
macroeconomic forecasts, which form the basis for the assessment of fiscal policy in the EU 
Member States. The autumn forecast is of particular importance. First because it takes a 
farther look into the future: It covers two years beyond the current period, as opposed to one 
year in the spring forecast. Second and more importantly it serves as a benchmark for the 
Commission services' assessment of the budgetary plans outlined in the stability and 
convergence programmes. In particular, the indications emerging from the forecast serve as 
benchmark when assessing whether official plans, which typically include the most recent 
budget, do or do not comply with the requirements of the Pact.  
The window of opportunities for the Commission to take steps under the provisions of the 
Pact on the basis of the autumn forecast in a given year t ahead of the actual occurrence of an   3
excessive deficit is relatively short. It essentially covers the remainder of the year t in which 
the autumn forecast is made as well as the forecast for the year after i.e. t+1. The two-year-
ahead forecast is generally less binding or informative: first, because of the larger degree of 
uncertainty attached to projections of more distant years, and second because of the 
underlying no-policy-change assumption. Since the draft budget for year t+2 is only revealed 
in the second half of t+1, the two-year-ahead forecast produced at the end of year t merely 
provides indications about what the budget balance would be if the fiscal authorities remained 
completely inactive.  
In terms of diagnostic instruments the focus of the paper will be mainly on three measures: (i) 
the so-called safety margin, which in a given year measures the risk of breaching the 3% of 
GDP reference value of the Treaty with normal cyclical fluctuations and (ii) the level of the 
cyclically-adjusted budget balance, which indicates the distance to the medium-term 
budgetary objective and (iii) the change in the CAB which is used to assess the fiscal 
adjustment effort planned or implemented by Member States. All three indicators are a 
function of real-time output gap estimates and hence will take on different values depending 
on the size of the smoothing parameter λ. The ultimate aim is to better understand the trade-
off between safeguarding against the risk of breaching the 3% of GDP threshold on the one 
hand and fiscal stabilisation on the other. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the use of the 
output gap and the CAB in the EU fiscal surveillance framework. Section 3 outlines the set-up 
and design of our numerical simulation. Section 4 summaries first the general results of the 
simulation and then examines some particularly interesting country examples showing 
whether and how the assessment of fiscal policy in real-time would have changed for different 
estimates of potential output and the output gap. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The use of the cyclically-adjusted budget balance and the output gap in the EU fiscal 
surveillance  
Potential output and the output gap are widely used measures to determine an economy’s 
position in the cycle. In the area of fiscal policy they are commonly used to estimate the 
transitory elements in the budget resulting from cyclical fluctuations in economic activity so 
as to disclose the underlying fiscal position, which is generally referred to as cyclically-
adjusted budget balance (CAB). In the EU fiscal surveillance the CAB is defined as: 
(1)  OG BB CC BB CAB ⋅ − = − = ε  
where BB stands for the nominal budget balance in percent of GDP and OG for the output 
gap, which in turn is defined as the percentage difference between actual GDP (Y ) and 
potential GDP (
* Y ), both expressed in real terms, i.e.  100 / ) (
* * ⋅ − Y Y Y . The parameter ε 
denotes the budgetary sensitivity, i.e. the change of the budget balance with respect to 
changes in the output gap.  
The maximum level of the CAB which allows a country to let automatic stabilizers work 
freely without risking breaching the 3% of GDP reference value under normal cyclical 
circumstances is referred to as minimum benchmark. It is obtained as the difference between   4
the 3% of GDP reference value of the Treaty and the so-called safety margin, the budgetary 
impact during particularly weak cyclical conditions.
2 
The minimum benchmark is applied under the provisions of the preventive arm of the SGP, 
which through regular surveillance of fiscal developments and plans aims at (i) preventing 
budget deficits going above the 3% reference value of the Treaty and (ii) ensuring that 
Member States adjust their budgets towards sustainable positions in the medium-term. If the 
estimated CAB of a given year is found to be lower than the minimum benchmark, it is 
generally taken as an indication of a tangible or imminent risk for the nominal deficit to 
exceed the 3% of GDP reference value. Similarly, if Member States do not sufficiently 
improve or do not plan to sufficiently improve their underlying budgetary position each year, 
this may also be found to run afoul of the provisions of the preventive arm of the Pact. 
Up until 2003 the Commission services had been regularly using the CAB and the minimum 
benchmark only as informal analytical tools for the analysis of the budgetary situation.
3 In 
March 2003, following the November 2002 Commission Communication ‘Strengthening the 
co-ordination of budgetary policies’, the ECOFIN Council adopted a report upgrading the 
status of the CAB from a complementary analytical tool to a key element to assess 
compliance with a number of SGP provisions.
4 Specifically, the report considered that the 
compliance with the close-to-balance or in surplus requirement of the unreformed Pact should 
be assessed in cyclically-adjusted terms and that countries with a deficit must improve their 
cyclically-adjusted budget position and, in the case of euro area countries, by a minimum 
annual reduction of 0.5% of GDP.
5 The official endorsement of the CAB resulted from the 
rather unsatisfying experience of monitoring budgetary policy in nominal terms. It became 
clear that the budgetary ‘noise’ stemming from cyclical variations precluded sensible 
conclusions about the underlying stance and thrust of fiscal policy. To overcome the problem 
of moving targets it was necessary to resort to a benchmark against which to measure and 
isolate the operation of automatic stabilisers, i.e. trend or potential output. 
For many years the measure of the output gap used by the Commission services to calculate 
the CAB was exclusively based upon potential output estimates derived from the Hodrick-
Prescott (HP) filter (see equation (2) below). In line with common practice, the smoothing 
parameter λ used by the Commission services to filter actual real GDP was set equal to 100. 
In terms of the distribution of different frequencies between trend and cycle λ=100 implies 
                                                 
2 Formally, the minimum benchmark MB is defined as  ROG MB ⋅ − − = ε 3  where ε denotes the budgetary 
sensitivity and ROG the 'representative output gap' capturing a particularly weak position in the cycle. Up until 
July 2006, the 'representative output gap' was computed as the simple average of the three following alternatives: 
(i) the largest negative output gap observed in the sample period; (ii) the un-weighted average of the largest 
negative output gaps in the EU Member States in the sample period; (iii) two times the standard deviation of the 
output gap taken with minus sign. On 29 July 2006 the Economic and Financial Committee (EFC) adopted a new 
method to be applied in the future, which we do not consider for our backward-looking simulations. 
3 The only official reference was in the 1998 and 2001 Code of Conduct on the content and format of stability 
and convergence programmes defining the CAB and, linked to it, the minimal benchmark as useful working 
instruments. 
4 ECOFIN Council Report 6877/03 of 7 March 2003, endorsed by the European Council of March 21 and 22 
March 2003. 
5 Based on the Council report of March 2005, the one-size-fits-all close-to-balance or in surplus requirement  
was replaced by the requirement to achieve a country-specific medium-term objective which safeguards against 
the risks of breaching the 3% of GDP reference value of the Treaty and ensures long-term sustainability of 
public finances taking into account the impact of ageing populations.   5
that all cycles of up to eight-years are almost fully included into the cyclical component. 
Longer frequencies go into potential output. 
In July 2002, based on work carried out by the Commission services together with the 
Member States, the Council of the European Union decided to move to a production function 
approach as reference method for calculating the output gap and to use the HP as a backup 
method during a transition period. Except for Spain, for which the Commission services are 
still using the HP filter as a backup method, the transition period was effectively closed in 
May 2004. 
6 
In spite of the relatively recent change in methodology, our simulation described in detail in 
the next section is centred on the HP-filter for two reasons. Firstly, it allows for a longer 
sample period. Secondly, while providing a more structural setting to the calculation of 
potential output and the output gap the production function approach also involves the use of 
the HP filter, specifically, when calculating trend total factor productivity (TFP). Total factor 
productivity typically accounts for a very large part of GDP. Hence, mutatis mutandis, most 
of the conclusions of our simulation with the HP-filter are likely to carry over to the 
production function approach as well.  
 
3. Simulation 
Our data set covers the autumn forecasts for the EU15 countries, excluding Luxembourg, 
from 1998-2006.
7 For each calendar year t we have the budgetary projections over successive 
vintages of Commission services' autumn forecasts starting in year t-2 up until and including 
the outcome recorded in year t+1. Figure 1 below illustrates the structure of our data set.  
For each Commission services' autumn forecast in year t, we use the historical figures of real 
GDP up until year t-1 available at the time of the forecast plus the Commission services' 
projections for real GDP, to construct alternative forecasts of potential output and the output 
gap for three different values of the smoothing parameter λ, notably λ=10,  λ=1600 and 
λ=16000. The choice of the alternative values of the smoothing parameter λ is somewhat 
arbitrary. The value of 10 was chosen because according to the statistical literature (see Ravn 
and Uhlig, 2001) for annual data it roughly corresponds to the value of 1600 recommended by 
Hodrick and Prescott (1997) for quarterly figures. Conversely, the value of 16000 was simply 
chosen with a view to explore the effect of an ‘excessive’ degree of smoothing; it essentially 
amounts to the assumption that potential output follows a linear trend. 
Apart from the variations in the smoothing parameter the estimation of potential output and 
the output gap carried out in our simulation fully replicates the approach followed by the 
Commission services'. First, we use the same starting point for the historical real GDP series, 
namely 1965. Second, in order to address the so called end-point problem of the real GDP 
series, the forecasts have been extended on the basis of country-specific time-series models 
for the next three year. The specification of the models is the one used by the Commission 
services.
8 
                                                 
6 For the sake of completeness, the Commission services continue to estimate potential output with both methods 
for all countries. 
7 We do not include Luxembourg because no estimates for the budgetary sensitivity parameter ε were available 
before autumn 2000. 
8 The Commission services' use ARIMA models to extent the GDP series beyond the last year of the forecast. 
They are country specific and in view of the annual frequency of the data generally very parsimonious.    6
 
 
Figure 1: Structure of the data set – Projections of specific years in successive vintages of Commission 









































































The output gap series obtained for different values of λ are in turn used to calculate alternative 
CABs and safety margins. Given that none of the alternative CAB series are a priori superior 
we judge them with respect to their potential implications for fiscal surveillance. The key 
questions are:  
•  What is the impact of different smoothing parameters on the assessment of the 
underlying budgetary position? 
•  How do alternative smoothing parameters affect the ability of the CAB and the safety 
margin to anticipate the occurrence of an excessive deficit?  
•  How does the assessment of the projected fiscal adjustment, as measured by the 
change in the CAB, evolve over successive forecasts for different λs?  
As regards the first question, the litmus test for the CAB and safety margin of alternative λs 
will be whether the occurrence of an excessive deficit in subsequent years is anticipated or 
not, while preserving some leeway for fiscal stabilisation/smoothing. The emphasis on fiscal 
smoothing is important because a trivial way of maximising the probability of anticipating 
deficits in excess of 3% of GDP in practice would be to set λ equal to zero, which effectively 
amounts to focusing attention on nominal budget balances only.
9 Hence, it will be interesting 
to see how much cyclical smoothing is acceptable before the diagnostic accuracy worsens. 
In actual practice the implications of different λs for a typical assessment cycle are assessed as 
follows. We compare the fiscal outturn of year t-1  as recorded at the moment of the 
Commission services' autumn forecast of year t, with the projections for the same year t-1 in 
the two preceding Commission services' forecasts, i.e. in year t-1 and t-2. We do not consider 
the two-year-ahead forecast, for two reasons. First, as mentioned before, its information 
content about the actual outturn can be taken to be relatively limited because it does not 
                                                 
9 Note that lower levels of λ perform better in maximising the probability of anticipating excessive deficits in 
economic bad times when growth is below past trend values as has been the case in the recent experience. 
However, in case of temporary positive growth shocks, higher values of λ tend to give more cautious signals.   7
include the fiscal measures of future budgets. Second, it would reduce the size of our sample 
by one year; it is not available for the year 1999. Overall, this leaves us with 6 cases per 
country and for each choice of λ, in total 98 cases. 
 
4. Results of the numerical simulation 
The presentation of the results of our numerical simulation is in two parts. The first part 
reviews the general implications of different degrees of smoothing for the EU budgetary 
surveillance. It highlights the effects on the key diagnostic instruments. The second part looks 
more closely at whether and how the assessment of some specific country cases would have 
changed. Specifically, as regards the corrective arm of the Pact the focus will be on Germany, 
France and the Netherlands. In relation to the preventive arm we look at Germany, Spain, 
Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom. 
4.1 General results 
The HP-filter is a purely statistical method. Due to its simplicity it is particularly popular in 
practice to separate a given time series into a trend and a cyclical component. This is achieved 
by minimising the following expression: 
(2)  () ( ) () ∑
=
+ ∆ − ∆ + −
T
t
t t t t
Y





* min λ . 
The parameter λ is the relative weight attached to the variability of the trend component Y* 
vis-à-vis the deviation from the trend. This implies: the smoothness of the trend component 
Y* increases with λ. In the frequency domain, the size of the smoothing parameter λ 
determines the distribution of frequencies between the trend and the cyclical component. A 
higher λ allocates a lower share of high frequency components to the trend Y*; the rest goes 
into the cycle which tends to increase in size. In other words, a higher λ yields larger output 
gaps. 
In the context of our numerical simulation, this general property is illustrated in Figure 2. It 
shows the frequency distributions of the output gap estimates of the fourteen euro area 
countries for the entire forecast period of the successive vintages of the Commission services' 
autumn forecast in 1998-2006; in total 504 observations (14 countries over 8 successive 
autumn forecasts, and 4 years per forecast with some missing data points at the beginning and 
the end of the sample). 
The number of large output gap estimates, positive and negative, increases with the smoothing 
parameter λ. For λ=100 - the default value used by the Commission services – only 25% of 
the output gap estimates are larger than 1 or smaller than –1. This share drops to around 10% 
for λ=10 and climbs to slightly above 40% when λ=1600. In all three cases the frequency 
distribution remains broadly bell-shaped suggesting symmetry of the cycle. This feature 
disappears when λ reaches the extreme value of 16000.  The frequency distribution is 
essentially flat and markedly skewed towards negative values. The reason for the thick 
negative tail is sample specific. It reflects the loss of economic momentum during the 
protracted economic downturn recorded after 2000, which due to the excessive degree of 
smoothing of the trend is taken to be largely cyclical. 
In each successive autumn forecast the trend is adjusted only marginally in spite of the 
slowing of actual growth, giving rise to a consistently unfavourable assessment of the cyclical 
conditions, on the assumption that economic activity will bounce back to the original trend.   8
For the 504 data points of our sample λ=16000 yields only 188 positive output gaps as 
compared to around 240-260 for the other three values of the smoothing parameter.  
Figure 2: Frequency distribution of output gap estimates of successive Commission services' autumn 



















































































In essence, an excessive smoothing virtually excludes the possibility of permanent shocks. 
This is particularly evident in terms of the estimates of potential output growth which, as 
shown in the country-specific Figure 3, are adjusted only very gradually for λ=16000 
compared to lower values of the smoothing parameter. Such a pattern is at odds with 
perceived wisdom that the post-2000 downturn was largely permanent at least in the larger 
countries such as Germany, Italy and to some extent France. While the downward adjustment 
of potential growth estimates was quicker with a lower degree of smoothing, Figure 3 shows a 
rather volatile pattern in potential output growth for λ=10 and λ=100, which clashes with the 
common intuition according to which potential output growth should adjust rather gradually. 
The saw like pattern obtained with a low degree of smoothing reveals a recurring behaviour in 
economic forecasting observed during the post-2000 downturn. Since the downturn was 
thought to be short-lived, forecasters, including the Commission services, typically projected 
a quick and significant rebound of economic growth in the outer years of the forecast period. 
With a low degree of smoothing such hopes were passed on to estimates of trend output. 
 
Figure 3: Real-time potential output growth projections of successive Commission services' autumn 
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Figure 3 (continued): Real-time potential output growth projections of successive Commission services' 



























An alternative way of illustrating the impact of different degrees of smoothing is presented in 
Figure 4, which plots the output gap estimates for λ=10, 1600 and 16000 against those of the 
default value of 100. The 45-degree line splits the two-dimensional space into the south-
eastern area, which hosts output gap estimates that are higher for λ=100 and the north-western 
area where output gap estimates are lower for λ =100. 
 
   10
 
The patterns emerging from our simulation are fairly clear: higher (lower) smoothing tends to 
amplify (dampen) the estimated output gaps. The size of the output gap is roughly halved 
when λ is reduced to 10 and is inflated by about 50% when λ is increased to 1600. In both 
cases the variation of the smoothing parameter leads to a rotation around the origin of the 
Cartesian-cross. This element of symmetry is not preserved when λ is increased to 16000. On 
top of the amplification of negative and positive output gaps there is a clear shift of the 
average output towards negative territory corresponding to the thicker negative tail in the 
Figure 4: Output gap estimates in successive Commission services' autumn forecasts (1998-2006) for different λs: 
Euro area countries excluding Luxembourg. 





























































































   11
frequency distribution, hence reflecting the persistent pessimism about the cycle and, 
equivalently, the persistent optimism about the trend. 
Figure 5: Real-time estimates of the CAB in successive Commission services' autumn forecasts (1998-
2006): The impact of alternative values of the smoothing parameter λ. 













































































































































Variations of the output gap associated with different degree of smoothing impact the CAB in 
a dual way. For a given nominal budget balance, a larger negative output gap has an 
improving effect, a larger positive output gap a deteriorating effect on the assessment of the 
underlying budgetary position. Figure 5 illustrates the numerical effects in our sample. The 
size of the impact is typically dampened by the budgetary sensitivity of the budget, the 
parameter ε in Equation 1, which in practice is generally estimated at around between 0.5 (see   12
Girouard and Andre, 2005). Hence, for λ=10 the CAB deteriorates as compared to the default 
value of the smoothing parameter by only around 0.2 percentage point for each percentage 
point of the output gap when actual output is below potential; it improves by the same 
proportion for positive output gaps. The sign of the effect changes for λ=1600, i.e. the CAB 
improves (deteriorates) for negative (positive) output gaps, yet is similar in size. In case of an 
excessive smoothing (λ=16000), the effect is significantly larger and goes along with a more 
general improvement of the CAB.  
Under the provisions of the SGP, the effect of different degrees of smoothing on the CAB 
would overall be relatively moderate, yet could have measurable implications for the 
assessment of a country’s position with respect to its medium-term budgetary objective. A 
higher degree of smoothing would lead to a somewhat laxer judgment in economic bad times, 
and it would be consistent with a stricter judgment in economic good times. In particular, the 
required fiscal adjustment to achieve the medium-term budgetary objective could be assessed 
to be somewhat lower when economic conditions are less favourable and higher when they 
are favourable.  
At first sight, the uncertainty about the level of the CAB does not seem to carry over to its 
change over time. Different λs, even extreme values, make little or almost no difference in 
terms of the frequency distribution of the estimated changes in the CAB. As shown in Figure 
6 the lines are very close for the four degrees of smoothing considered and hence seem to 
confirm the to practitioners familiar observation that changes in the CAB are relative robust 
across different methods. However, this picture is somewhat deceiving. While the frequency 
distributions are very close, the distribution across time is significantly affected by the choice 
of the smoothing parameter λ. This will become clear when discussing country-specific cases 
below. 
10 
Figure 6: Frequency distribution of changes in the CAB in successive Commission services' autumn 

















































































Turning to the objective of forestalling the occurrence of excessive deficits during a typical 
assessment cycle of the SGP our sample includes 18 cases in which the nominal deficit in 
year t-1 was estimated above 3% of GDP in the Commission services' forecast of year t, 
which would normally trigger the excessive deficit procedure, more specifically the 
Commission would present a report according to Article 104(3) of the Treaty. As shown in 
                                                 
10 The similarity of the frequency distribution of changes in the CAB for different smoothing parameters is 
linked to the fact that the application of two filters i.e. the HP and first differences, tend to remove the same type 
of variations in the frequency domain.   13
Table 1, for the default value of λ=100 all those 18 cases where correctly anticipated by a 
negative safety margin in the Commission services' forecast of the preceding year, that is year 
t-1. The same would have been true for λ=10 and λ=1600, suggesting that alternative degrees 
of smoothing do not seem to affect the diagnostic accuracy for the forecast of the current year. 
Only when λ is set equal to 16000 one of the 18 cases of nominal deficit in excess of 3% of 
GDP would have escaped attention. However, the leakage increases significantly for the one-
year-ahead forecast, when with λ=16000 only 11 out the 18 cases are correctly anticipated by 
a negative safety margin. The score is markedly better yet not optimal for the three other 
values of the smoothing parameter. 
Table 1: Nominal deficit in excess of 3% of GDP and negative safety margins in preceding Commission 
services' forecasts (1998-2006): Euro area countries excluding Luxembourg.  
Reporting year
Commission 
autumn forecast  t   t-1 t   t-1 t   t-1 t   t-1
Count 18 16 18 15 18 17 17 11
t-1 t-1 t-1 t-1 t-1   
18
Nominal deficit in excess of 
3% of GDP
t
Safety margin < 0
Smoothing parameter λ
100 10 1600 16000
 
The diagnostic accuracy of the CAB for different degrees of smoothing can also be tested by 
estimating a binary choice model, which in addition to the safety margin can control for other 
variables affecting the odds of exceeding the 3% of GDP threshold. For our purposes the 
following probit-model was used: 
(3)  t i t t t t i t t i t t t t e pw pw cab sm ex + − + ∆ + + = − − − − − − − − ) ( , 1 , 1 3 , 1 2 , 1 1 0 , 1 β β β β    for i=1,2. 
where  t t ex , 1 −  takes the value 1 when the nominal deficit of year t-1 as estimated in year t is 
higher than 3% of GDP, and 0 otherwise.  i t t sm − − , 1  and  i t t cab − − ∆ , 1 denote the safety margin and 
the change in the CAB for year t-1, respectively, both projected in year t-i. The third 
explanatory variable measures the revision of potential output growth in year t-1 as projected 
in year t-i. 
Our  a priori concerning the coefficients in Equation (3) are that they should all have a 
negative sign:  1 β  because a higher safety margin for year t-1 projected in year t-i is expected 
to decrease the probability of a nominal deficit in excess of 3% of GDP;  2 β  for the reason 
that an improvement in the underlying budgetary position should help stem the risk of 
exceeding the 3% of GDP threshold for the deficit;  3 β  because an upward revision of growth 
should ceteris paribus go along with an improvement of the budgetary position. 
The estimation results, which are summarised in Table 2, broadly confirm these a priori. This 
is particularly true for the safety margin. The estimate for 1 β  has the expected negative sign 
and is statistically significant. It has the largest size for λ =100 and is only slightly lower for 
λ=10 and λ=1600. Conversely, it is essentially halved for λ =16000. The coefficients of the   14
change in the CAB and the revision of potential output growth, while mostly carrying the 
expected algebraic sign, do not turn out to be statistically significant at conventional levels.
11 
Table 2a and 2b: Probit model for nominal deficit above or below the 3% of GDP threshold 
Results of maximum likelihood estimation. 
Smoothing parameter λ β  1 prob. value β  2 prob. value β  3 prob. value
10 -1.49 0.00 -0.38 0.33 21.11 0.82
100 -1.14 0.00 -0.38 0.35 1.12 0.99
1600 -1.21 0.00 -0.28 0.37 19.38 0.88
16000 -0.67 0.00 -0.04 0.86 -240.03 0.32
Estimated coefficients
Note: The estimates reported in the table refer to the following Probit equation 
t i t t t t i t t i t t t t e pw pw cab sm ex + − + ∆ + + = − − − − − − − − ) ( , 1 , 1 3 , 1 2 , 1 1 0 , 1 β β β β  for i=1,2 where  t t ex , 1 −  takes the value 1 
when the nominal deficit of year t-1 as estimated in year t is higher than 3% of GDP, and 0 otherwise.  i t t sm − − , 1  and  i t t cab − − ∆ , 1 denote 
the safety margin and the change in the CAB for year t-1, respectively, both projected in year t-i. The third explanatory variable measures the 
revision of potential output growth in year t-1 as projected in year t-i. Sample period: 1998-2006. Countries: EU15 excluding Luxembourg. 
Smoothing parameter λ β  1 prob. value β  2 prob. value β  3 prob. value
10 -0.61 0.00 -0.15 0.42 -37.86 0.51
100 -0.47 0.00 -0.17 0.38 -17.66 0.68
1600 -0.68 0.00 -0.20 0.27 -25.08 0.78
16000 -0.34 0.00 -0.02 0.87 0.16 0.26
Estimated coefficients
 
Note: The estimates reported in this table refer to a variation of the Probit model shown in the note to Table 2a. Specifically, the sum of the 
safety margins and the sum of the change in the CAB over two successive Commission services' forecasts are used as explanatory variables:  
t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t e pw pw cab cab sm sm ex + − + ∆ + ∆ + + + = − − − − − − − − − − − − ) ( ) ( ) ( 2 , 1 , 1 3 2 , 1 1 , 1 2 2 , 1 1 , 1 1 0 , 1 β β β β   for i=1,2. 
 
As a last point in this section we focus on the revisions of the output gap and the CAB 
estimates across time. Real-time estimates of the output gap and in turn of the CAB tend to be 
significantly revised with the arrival of new data of the successive years, which generally has 
implications for the assessment of fiscal policy. For instance, an output gap that was estimated 
to be close to zero or negative in real time may turn out to actually have been sizeably 
positive. In that case, hindsight may show that the fiscal policy stance chosen at the time may 
not have been appropriate. 
 
                                                 
11 Both the results of the counting exercise reported in Table 1 as well as the estimates displayed in Table 2 are 
based on the assumption that the minimum benchmarks remain constant for different smoothing parameters λ. 
This is a simplification taking into account that the estimates of the minimum benchmark incorporate estimates 
of the output gap (see footnote 2). Hence, a different choice of λ not only affects the CAB, it should also have an 
impact on the minimum benchmark. Specifically, a higher (lower) λ tends to increase (reduce) the size of the 
output gap estimates which in turn increase (reduce) the safety margin that protects against the risk of breaching 
the 3% of GDP threshold. In practice, the CAB and the minimum benchmark should actually move into the same 
direction: a more favourable assessment of the underlying budgetary position should go along with a stricter 
benchmark. Against this backdrop our simulations may actually exacerbate the effect of different λs for 
budgetary surveillance. Taking explicitly account of the effects of different λs on the minimum benchmark is a 
possible extension to our work.   15
In our simulation two different perspectives are of interest: (i) the revisions throughout a 
typical assessment cycle of the EU surveillance framework i.e. the revision of a given year in 
three successive Commission services’ autumn forecasts; and (ii) the revisions between the 
first estimate in real time and the estimate based on the latest available information.
12  
In both cases the main conclusions turn out to be similar: choosing a smooth trend for GDP 
increases the degree of uncertainty attached to output gap estimates. This is already evident 
over a period of three years or three successive Commission services' autumn forecasts. In our 
sample, both the average of the absolute value of the revisions as well as the variance increase 
with the value of the smoothing parameter λ (see Table 3). In terms of the algebraic sign of 
the output gap estimates, a high smoothing parameter seems, at first glance, to yield more 
stable results. However, this is simply due to the fact that the estimates tend to be much bigger 
in size, so that even large revisions may leave the algebraic sign of the estimate unaltered at 
least over a short period of time.  
Table 3: Revisions of output gap for a given year t between Commission services' forecast in year t-1 and year t+1 
(1998-2006): Euro area countries excluding Luxembourg. 
Output gap average absolute revision 0.8 0.6 1.1 1.1
0.5 0.2 0.7 0.9
sign change 32.7% 27.6% 22.4% 17.3%
CAB 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.2
0.9 0.8 0.9 0.9 variance of absolute revision
variance of absolute revision
average absolute revision
Smoothing parameter λ
100 10 1600 16000
 
The volatility of the output gap estimates for λ=16000 becomes even more clear-cut as data of 
additional years arrive. The estimates of the years 1999, 2000 and 2001 in successive 
Commission services' autumn forecasts including the latest available one (autumn 2006) are 
particularly striking examples. Figure 7 shows the respective numbers for the three largest 
euro area countries Germany, France and Italy. In all three cases a very high degree of 
smoothing goes along with particularly large swings in the output gap estimates for a given 
year, implying that from an ex post point of view fiscal policy will almost certainly be judged 
to have been wide off the mark. The revisions are not exactly negligible for lower values of λ 
either, yet their size is more contained. Conceptually, the big 'surprises' are inter alia a 
reflection of the type of underlying economic model that goes with a very high degree of 
smoothing. It essentially assumes that actual output evolves around a virtually stable trend, a 
pattern that does not fit the data. In line with the original findings of Nelson and Plosser 
(1982) for the US, the by now prevailing view is that economic activity follows a stochastic 
trend; i.e. shocks produce permanent effects. Choosing a very large smoothing parameter 
essentially amounts to denying the existence of permanent shocks. The findings of Nelson and 
Plosser (1982) about the nature of economic fluctuations have been confirmed for most EU 
countries; see for instance Darne and Diebolt (2004). 
 
 
                                                 
12 For the purpose of our simulation the latest available estimates were those of the Commission services’ 
autumn 2006 forecast.   16
Figure 7: Output gap estimates in successive Commission services' autumn forecasts (1998-2006): 
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Figure 7 (continued): Output gap estimates in successive Commission services' autumn forecasts (1998-










































































4.2 Prominent country cases: Would a different degree of smoothing have made a 
difference? 
In this section we will tentatively assess whether a different degree of smoothing could have 
made a difference in fiscal surveillance under the SGP in some selected country cases. First, 
we look at the corrective arm of the SGP. As the entry into and exit out of the excessive 
deficit procedure is guided by nominal deficit figures, we focus on the required fiscal efforts 
in the policy recommendations and the assessment of compliance with these 
recommendations. Secondly, we consider whether a different degree of smoothing would 
have sent different signals in the preventive arm of the Pact.   
4.2.1 Corrective arm  
If the Council decides on the existence of an excessive deficit, it recommends an annual fiscal 
effort to the Member State in order to ensure that the nominal deficit is reduced below the 
reference value in a sustainable manor by the set deadline. Since the 2005 reform of the Pact, 
a change in the structural balance (i.e. cyclically adjusted balance net of one-off and 
temporary measures) of at least 0.5% is required. While the reason for failure to take the 
deficit below the reference value by the deadline for correction of the excessive deficit had no 
material impact on the procedure before the 2005 SGP reform, it does play an important role 
in the revised SGP. If a Member State achieves the fiscal effort, but does not reduce the 
deficit below the reference value by the deadline set by the Council solely due to unforeseen   18
economic developments outside the control of the government, a move to the following step 
in the excessive deficit procedure (closer to sanctions) can be avoided and the deadline for the 
correction of the excessive deficit can be extended. In this way, the revised SGP makes a 
difference between policy and forecast errors. 
We will look at the assessment of the fiscal effort; whether the country in the EDP complied 
with the recommended improvement in the cyclically-adjusted or structural balances. It 
should be considered that we do not redo the full assessment, we only analyse to what extent a 
different degree of smoothing would have affected one important indicator of the fiscal effort 
(the change of the CAB) and whether it could have given different signals about the fiscal 
policy effort on the basis of the data in some selected cases. The countries we look at are 
Germany, France and the Netherlands. We do not look at Portugal in the assessment of 
compliance with the required fiscal effort, because no explicit fiscal effort in cyclically-
adjusted terms had been defined by the Council when it issued its recommendation in 2002. 
Neither do we look at the more recent cases, for which the time frame is rather short to make 
an assessment of the impact of different degrees of smoothing.   
Germany  
Following evidence of a government deficit above 3% of GDP in 2002, the Council decided 
in spring 2003 that an excessive deficit existed in Germany and it adopted a recommendation 
under Article 104(7) of the Treaty with a view to bring this situation to an end by 2004. To 
this end, Germany was required to take measures amounting to an improvement in the 
structural balance (i.e. the cyclically-adjusted budget balance net of one-off and temporary 
measures) by 1 % of GDP cumulated over 2003 and 2004.  































In autumn 2003, the Commission considered that the actions taken by Germany were 
inadequate to correct the excessive deficit. Figure 8 shows the fiscal effort measured by the 
change in the CAB.
13 Looking at the projected change of the CAB over 2003 and 2004 when 
it was assessed in autumn 2003, it fell far short of the required 1 percent of GDP on the basis 
of all parameters λ considered in our simulation. On the basis of a low λ, the underlying fiscal 
position showed no improvement at all, while on the basis of very high λ, the improvement 
was limited to ½ percent of GDP. 
The Commission recommended to the Council to move to the next step in the excessive 
deficit procedure and adopt a decision giving notice to Germany under Treaty article 104(9) 
                                                 
13 Note that the forecast for the 2004 nominal deficit was at the time, before the reform of the SGP in 2005, the 
guiding criterion to decide a move to the next step of the procedure.   19
to take measures to remedy the situation. In the light of the weaker-than-expected economic 
situation, the Commission recommended that the deadline for correcting the deficit should be 
extended by one year to 2005. The Council voted on the recommended decisions but did not 
achieve the required majority.  
On the basis of the information available at the time, the Commission's recommendation to 
move to the next step of the excessive deficit procedure would not have been affected by 
looking at other measures of the CAB. And, even if the rules of the revised Pact would have 
applied at the time, a notice under article 104(9) would have been called for by the data, as the 
required structural effort had not been met.   
With the available data in autumn 2004, the overall situation had improved only marginally 
and the choice of λ would still not have made a difference in the assessment. By that time, the 
EDP procedure of Germany and France were in an unclear legal situation after the failure of 
the Council to adopt the Commission recommendation in November 2003.  
In 2005, the situation had changed significantly. If the fiscal effort over 2003 and 2004 would 
have been assessed in 2005, different degrees of smoothing would have led to different 
conclusions about compliance with the required structural adjustment effort. The commonly 
used λs of 10 and 100 would have still signalled a significant shortfall of the fiscal effort and 
indicated that a fiscal policy error or fiscal slippage was at the origin of the failure to correct 
the excessive deficit. They attribute little of the revenue shortfalls to cyclical effects as the 
potential growth rate estimate for the period 2003-2005 ranges from 0.9 to 1.1 % for a λ of 10 
to 1.2% for a λ of 100. The higher λs, which assume a more stable potential or trend growth, 
would indicate compliance with the fiscal requirement. The failure to correct the excessive 
deficit would be attributed to a deterioration of cyclical conditions, as potential growth for a λ 
of 1600 was estimated at around 1.6%.  
France 
Like for Germany, the Council decided in spring 2003 that an excessive deficit existed in 
France following evidence of a government deficit above 3% of GDP in 2002. It adopted a 
recommendation under Article 104(7) of the Treaty with a view to bring this situation to an 
end by 2004 at the latest. To this end, France was required to take measures amounting to an 
improvement in the structural balance (i.e. the CAB net of one-off and temporary measures) 
of 0.5% of GDP in 2004. For 2003, the recommendation said that the French authorities 
should achieve a significantly larger improvement in the CAB in 2003 than that planned at the 
time. As a deterioration in the CAB was forecast in spring 2003, we assume that this 
recommendation for 2003 implied that the CAB should at least improve. It also recommended 
that the CAB should be improved by a larger amount if necessary to ensure that the 
cumulative improvement in 2003-2004 would be enough to bring the nominal deficit below 
3% in 2004 at the latest, emphasising that the nominal requirement was the main element in 
the assessment.  
In autumn 2003, the Commission considered that – as in the case of Germany - the actions 
taken by France were inadequate to correct the excessive deficit. Figure 9 shows the fiscal 
effort measured by the change in CAB. Looking at the projected change in the CAB over 
2003 and 2004 when it was assessed in autumn 2003, it fell short of the required 0.5 % of 
GDP minimum improvement on the basis of all λs considered. More importantly, the CAB 
was projected to deteriorate in 2003 (Figure 10). Again the choice of λ made no material 
difference.  
The Commission recommended to the Council to move to the next step in the excessive 
deficit procedure and to adopt a decision giving notice to France under Treaty article 104(9)   20
to take measures to remedy the situation. In the light of the weaker-than-expected economic 
situation, the Commission recommended that the deadline for correcting the deficit should be 
extended by one year to 2005. The Council voted on the recommended decisions but did not 
achieve the required majority.  
There is however a remarkable difference with the assessment of the German fiscal effort on 
the basis of the ex-post data available in 2005. While for Germany the choice of λ does lead to 
a different assessment ex post of the fiscal effort in 2003 - 2004, in France the difference 
between the measures remains rather small. 
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Netherlands  
The case of the excessive deficit in the Netherlands is an interesting one, as it arose from a 
very quick reversal of economic fortunes. The Netherlands came from a prolonged period of 
high growth and a perception of high growth potential with real GDP growth averaging 3.7% 
in the second half of the 1990s. In this context, the budgetary position was perceived to be 
close to balance or in surplus. The deterioration of the budgetary situation in 2003 was abrupt 
and unexpected and it made the effort to bring the deficit below 3% of GDP larger than 
expected in the 2003 budget.  
In the light of a reported general government deficit of 3.2% of GDP in 2003 and considering 
the risk that the deficit might stay above 3% of GDP in 2004, the Council decided in spring 
2004 that an excessive deficit existed in the Netherlands. It recommended the government to 
put an end to the excessive deficit by 2005 at the latest. To that end, the government should 
implement a package of measures that it had adopted shortly before of 0.6% of GDP in 2004 
and it should take structural measures amounting to at least 0.5% of GDP in 2005. The 
Commission and the Council considered in autumn 2004 that the Netherlands had taken 
effective action. 
In this context, there is a remarkable difference in signals coming from the measures of 
changes in the CAB on the basis of the different smoothing parameters λ. The higher levels of 
λ, which reflect the assumption that the growth slowdown was largely temporary and potential 
output growth remained rather high, signal a rather large improvement in the CAB. The lower 
degrees of smoothing (in particular λ = 10) reflect the assumption that potential growth 
declined requiring more fiscal adjustment to avoid rapid deterioration of the CAB. An 
assessment on the basis of λ=10 in autumn 2004 would have signalled that the fiscal effort in 
that year would fall far short of the required 0.6% of GDP and further efforts would have been 
needed. In fact, it showed an improvement in the CAB of merely 0.1% (Figure 13).   
In spring 2005, the nominal deficit outcome for 2004 of less than 3% of GDP and the 
forecasts for a further decline in the deficit led the Commission and the Council to abrogate 
the excessive deficit procedure for the Netherlands.   
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Figure 13: The Netherlands - Change of the CAB in 2004. 
 
Figure 14: The Netherlands - Change of the CAB in 2005. 
 
 
4.2.2 The preventive arm of the Pact  
The preventive arm of the Pact establishes a requirement for Member States to ensure the 
necessary room for manoeuvre for cyclical stabilisation through the working of the automatic 
stabilisers without the 3% of GDP reference value for deficits being breached. It also asks 
Member States to move towards or maintain sustainable budgetary positions in the medium 
term (see e.g. Buti and Sapir, 2002).
14The Council can exert peer pressure and raise its 
concern about budgetary developments and possibly an increased risk of breaching the 3% of 
GDP reference value in the future by means of an ‘early warning’ or in its Opinion on the 
annual stability or convergence programme update.
15  
Below, we will look at several country cases to assess whether and to what extent alternative 
degrees of smoothing would imply differences in the CAB and thus different signals about the 
safety margin and the risk of occurrence of an excessive deficit.  
In the case of France, Germany and Italy, CAB estimates for a relatively low degree of 
smoothing (λ equal to 10 and 100) indicated risks of breaching the reference value in the 
                                                 
14 In addition, it would lead to a rapid reduction of the government debt to GDP ratio, also lowering the interest 
burden. 
15 In general, ‘early warnings’ have been initiated when the forecast for t+1 showed a nominal deficit above 3% 
rather than on the basis of the CAB and a breach of the safety margin.   23
year(s) before it occurred. Using higher values for the smoothing parameter, the signals were 
less strong, especially in France (2000 and 2001) and Italy (2001-2004). In general, in these 
countries, the underlying budgetary position seemed more sound with smoother potential 
output measures. In Italy, the difference with the extremely rigid potential growth estimate 
(λ=16000) is particularly large because the slowdown was sharp and protracted. Conversely, 
for the Netherlands, the higher levels of λ (especially 1600) proved to be better indicators of 
the underlying budgetary position in 2002 because unlike in Italy the bust was followed by a 
relatively quick recovery to comparatively high growth rate. This is an indication that the 
appropriateness of a specific the degree of smoothing may in principle change over time and 
across country. 
Figure 15: Real time CAB estimates in 1999-2005 with different smoothing parameters λ: Germany, France, 
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Figure 16 shows the estimates of the CAB in some other countries. The difference between 
CAB estimates using parameter values 10 and 100 is still rather small. In fact the differences 
observed in Spain and Ireland may be the largest in our sample between these two parameter 
values. It indicates that the CAB estimates are rather robust to a choice between these values. 
The difference is again much more pronounced when looking at the smooth estimates of 
potential output (λ equal to 1600 and 16000). In particular, in the cases of Spain, Ireland and 
the UK, and in contrast to the simulations of Germany, France and Italy, the CAB estimates 
on the basis of less sensitive potential growth give a less rosy picture of the underlying budget 
balance than the more commonly used parameter settings because the output gaps are 
estimated to be positive. In the Irish case, the difference is most striking, with values in a 
range of more than three percentage points depending on the degree of smoothing. The   24
difference persists over a five year period as the economy is consistently estimated to operate 
above potential. In the case of Ireland, very high values of λ can be considered not 
appropriate, as they imply that the growth boom in the second half of the 1990s has been 
cyclical and still leads to a large output gap.  
Figure 16: Real time CAB estimates in 1999-2005 with different smoothing parameters λ: Spain, Ireland, 
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The Spanish case may also be of interest, as there is some ongoing discussion on the size of 
the output gap in that country. The prolonged period of high growth with a sharply 
deteriorating current account balance and rather high inflation continues to spur discussion on 
overheating. The conventional potential output estimates are often blamed for not providing 
the right signals. While there are some differences for alternative values of λ, they are not 
particularly large compared to other countries. This is essentially due to the fact, that growth 
has been comparatively smooth over a long period of time. Hence, there is little variation in 
the series to pack into the cycle even for large λs. Such a growth pattern makes the assessment 
of the underlying budgetary position particularly difficult. The question of how long the 
period of high growth can be sustained remains unanswered. 
All in all, in most cases, the difference in the levels of the CAB calculated with different 
degrees of smoothing is rather small, especially for the values 10 and 100 and generally also 
for 1600.    25
 
5. Conclusions 
Although very powerful as a theoretical concept, potential output and the output gap are rather 
elusive yet increasingly important ingredients of the EU fiscal surveillance framework. A 
priori there is no unambiguous way to discriminate between estimates with a higher or lower 
degree of smoothing.  
The assessment criteria of alternative potential output estimates applied in this paper is the 
diagnostic accuracy in the preventive and corrective arm of the Stability and Growth Pact. 
Different estimates of potential output and the output gap obtained by the HP-filter and 
characterized by a different degree of output smoothing are judged by their ability to timely 
signal the advent of desired or undesired budgetary developments. In this context different 
degrees of smoothing stand for different assumptions about the underlying model of economic 
development: prevalence of permanent shocks as opposed to mainly cyclical movements 
along a stable trend. 
Somewhat surprisingly our simulations show that the assessment of the underlying budget 
balance and the risk of breaching the reference value in fourteen euro-area countries in the 
1998-2006 period is relatively stable across a wide range of smoothing parameters. In 
particular, the signals for fiscal surveillance on the basis of the CAB are robust as long as the 
degree of smoothing stays within the commonly used ranges. In particular, there is generally 
little difference between signals on the basis of the parameter settings for λ of 10 and 100, 
which are used by the ECB and the Commission for annual data. This robustness is somewhat 
less clear-cut for countries like Ireland with a very volatile history of economic development 
and when higher values of λ are considered. 
The accuracy of the indicators used when assessing the fiscal effort on the basis of the 
improvement in the CAB eventually depends on the nature of the economic fluctuations. 
During a protracted economic upturn low values of λ will provide a rosier picture of the 
underlying budget balance than high values. This may give rise to more pro-cyclical policies. 
For example, if the protracted growth slowdown in Germany had to a certain extent been 
linked to prolonged downward wage and price adjustment (and thus a demand shortfall) 
which at some point would come to an end, a larger share of the growth slowdown could be 
attributed to an increase in the output gap. A higher degree of smoothing would then be a 
more accurate reflection of the underlying fiscal position and commonly-used lower values 
might give an overly pessimistic estimate of the underlying budgetary situation. A more 
smooth potential growth measure (higher λ) would also have resulted in less non-policy 
related changes in the CAB during the economic slowdown and subsequent recovery in the 
Netherlands, where measures of the CAB rapidly deteriorated and later recovered with 
commonly used potential growth measures. 
However, as long as shocks do not come with a label such considerations remain purely 
speculative. There is no optimal choice as regards the trade-off between fiscal stabilisation 
and risks of excessive deficits. Moreover, the implications for fiscal surveillance of different 
degrees of output smoothing with respect to up- and downturns are not symmetric. A low 
degree of smoothing may be a better safeguard against excessive deficits during downturns 
but it may imply a lenient assessment during upturns. Conversely, a high degree of smoothing 
may indeed carry the risk of accumulating excessive deficits during weak economic 
conditions but supports a stronger fiscal adjustment in economic good times. At the end, the 
actual choice of the degree of smoothing will reflect the preferences of the policy makers as 
regards the type of risk he or she wants to minimise.   26
Overall, in the light of our simulation results a somewhat higher degree of smoothing 
compared with the current default value of λ=100 would not seem to have a significant effect 
on the diagnostic accuracy in the framework of the EU budgetary surveillance. During 
economic upturns such as the current one a higher degree of output smoothing would imply a 
stricter assessment of fiscal policy by signalling larger and possibly longer periods of 
economic 'good times' which would in turn warrant stronger fiscal consolidation. Moreover, a 
higher degree of smoothing would also diminish the implications of optimism about future 
growth prospects. Specifically, projected accelerations of economic growth in future years 
would have a lower impact on current estimates of potential output and hence lead to a more 
cautious assessment of the underlying budgetary position of a country. 
Against this background, and with a view to bringing to light the different types of risks, a key 
practical conclusion of our simulation could be to assess fiscal policy on the basis of different 
smoothing parameters especially at particularly uncertain or critical economic junctures. Such 
an approach would serve as a kind of sensitivity analysis increasing the awareness of the 
trade-offs involved.    27
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